

Pozvánka na přednášku v rámci přednáškového cyklu

Renesance a středověk II

## **Brian Garcia**

(Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven)

## Thomas Aquinas and Dominicus de Flandria on the Ontological Status of the Phantasm

In De Anima III.3 (429a2), Aristotle determines phantasia to be a movement or motion produced by sensation in act. Later, in De Anima, III.7 (431a17), he announces the dictum that the soul never thinks without a phantasm. These concepts—phantasia and phantasma—and the schema within which they occurred in Aristotle had far-reaching ramifications in the later treatments of the soul and the operations of its potencies. This paper will press upon problems or ambiguities in Thomas Aguinas' presentation of the 'imagination' by inquiring into the ontological status of the phantasm. On the one hand, the phantasm seems to be something immediately bound up with sensation; on the other, the claim could be made that phantasms are in some way objects of the intellect. After a consideration of Thomas, we will then introduce the figure of Dominicus de Flandria—a 15th century Dominican Master who spent his mature intellectual career working in Italy—by taking up his Expositio super libros De Anima, a work that has been wholly neglected despite Dominic's 'fame' as a metaphysician in the Thomist tradition. We intend to treat Dominic as a careful reader of Thomas, and will look specifically at his elaboration of the internal senses, and then at his argument for the necessity of the phantasm for intellectual operation. The presentation of these topics will shed some light to determine whether Dominic resolves any ambiguities concerning the place of the phantasm, or offers a novel way of understanding the broader themes related to the imagination.

4.3.2014 v 15:00 hod.

Katedra filosofie FF UP Olomouc, Kateřinská 17, učebna 1.16



